Historical Context
Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia’s relationship is deeply rooted in colonialism. From 1906 to 1975, Australia administered PNG as a colonial territory. Initially, Australia took control of Papua (the southern half) in 1906, viewing it as a strategic buffer against German expansion in the Pacific. After World War I, Australia gained a League of Nations mandate over German New Guinea (the northern half), which it governed as a trust territory under the United Nations after World War II.
This period was marked by paternalistic policies: Australia imposed its administrative systems, exploited resources like gold and timber, and enforced racial segregation, with limited investment in local education or self-governance. PNG’s independence in 1975 was accelerated by international pressure and local resistance, but it left a legacy of economic dependency—Australia remains PNG’s largest aid donor, providing over AUD 600 million annually in recent years.
This colonial history fosters a power imbalance. PNG’s post-independence narrative often highlights exploitation, with Australian policies criticized for treating PNG as a “forgotten colony.” For instance, Australian historiography has largely erased PNG from its national story, focusing inward on continental affairs. Yet, ties remain “special”—PNG’s first prime minister, Michael Somare, described the relationship as “two houses with one fence,” emphasizing proximity and shared history. However, this closeness has bred resentment: PNG leaders have accused Australia of neo-colonial interference, such as in the 2019 Bougainville independence referendum or aid conditions tied to governance reforms.
Linking to current geopolitics, the Pukpuk Treaty (signed October 6, 2025) reflects Australia’s efforts to counter China’s growing influence in the Pacific amid U.S. retrenchment. China has invested heavily in PNG through the Belt and Road Initiative, funding infrastructure like ports and roads, raising fears of “debt-trap diplomacy.” Australia, aligned with the U.S. via AUKUS (2021), sees PNG as a strategic pivot: its geography controls key maritime chokepoints like the Torres Strait and Bismarck Sea, vital for denying Chinese naval access to Australia’s northern approaches.
The treaty aligns with broader agendas, such as the Quad (U.S., Australia, India, Japan) and Pacific Islands Forum, to maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Critics argue it revives colonial dynamics—Australia gains basing rights while PNG concedes sovereignty, echoing how colonial powers used territories as buffers against rivals (e.g., Britain vs. Germany pre-WWI).
Indonesia’s response highlights tensions: Jakarta urged respect for its sovereignty over West Papua, fearing the treaty could embolden separatists or Australian involvement in border conflicts.
Detailed Analysis: The Good and the Bad from Both Sides
The treaty, formally the Papua New Guinea – Australia Mutual Defence Treaty (Pukpuk Treaty), aims to enhance interoperability, mutual defense, and regional stability. It builds on prior agreements like the 1977 Status of Forces Agreement and 2024 Framework for Closer Security Relations.
However, it is asymmetric, with PNG conceding more on jurisdiction and access while Australia gains strategic footholds.
Below is a breakdown of pros and cons for each side, based on the treaty text and analyses.
| Aspect | Benefits for PNG (Good) | Drawbacks for PNG (Bad) | Benefits for Australia (Good) | Drawbacks for Australia (Bad) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mutual Defense (Article 4) | PNG gains Australia’s commitment to deter external threats, including armed attacks in the Pacific. This could bolster PNG’s weak defense force (PNGDF, ~2,000 personnel) against issues like illegal fishing (costing PNG ~K400 million annually) or border tensions with Indonesia. | PNG must consult and potentially join conflicts threatening Australia (e.g., vs. China), risking entanglement in great-power rivalries. PNG’s PM James Marape has stated PNG may “sit out” an Australia-China war, but the treaty’s language could pressure involvement, contradicting PNG’s “friends to all, enemies to none” neutrality. | Australia secures a formal ally in its northern flank, deterring Chinese incursions in the Arafura/Corral Seas. An attack on PNG is deemed “dangerous” to Australia’s security, enabling preemptive actions. | Australia must defend PNG, potentially drawing resources into PNG’s internal issues (e.g., Bougainville unrest) or Indonesia border disputes, straining budgets amid AUKUS delays. |
| Defense Cooperation (Article 5) | Includes capability uplift, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and recruitment of PNG citizens into the Australian Defence Force (ADF, up to 10,000 slots). This addresses PNG’s youth unemployment (~62% urban) and builds a 7,000-strong PNGDF through training and infrastructure. | Prohibits PNG from third-party deals compromising the treaty (e.g., with China), limiting foreign policy flexibility. Activities span cyber/space domains, potentially exposing PNG to espionage risks without equal tech access. | Enhances ADF interoperability, using PNG for basing, prepositioning materiel, and logistics integration. Addresses ADF shortages (e.g., submarine crews) with PNG recruits. | Commits Australia to costly uplift (e.g., infrastructure development), with risks if PNG pulls out or third parties (e.g., China) influence PNG politics. |
| Status of Personnel & Jurisdiction (Articles 6, 8; Annexes A-B) | PNG personnel gain access to Australian facilities for training, with mutual logistic support. | PNG concedes exclusive criminal/disciplinary jurisdiction to Australia over ADF personnel in PNG, even for off-duty acts in some cases. This could shield Australians from PNG justice (e.g., in accidents or crimes), eroding sovereignty. Annex B’s “enhanced provisions” favor Australia heavily. | ADF personnel enjoy immunities, visa exemptions, and freedom of movement in PNG, reducing legal risks. Exclusive jurisdiction protects against PNG courts. | Requires Australia to respect PNG laws and cooperate on investigations, with potential diplomatic fallout from incidents (e.g., ADF misconduct). |
| Agreed Facilities & Areas (Article 7; Annex C) | PNG gets free upgrades to facilities, with Australia funding operations for joint use. Could boost economic activity in remote areas. | Grants Australia “unimpeded access” to PNG facilities for exclusive or joint use, including prepositioning weapons/ammo. PNG cannot allow third-party access without Australian consent, risking neo-colonial perceptions. Facilities are “furnished without rental,” but Australia controls entry/security. | Provides basing for aircraft, vessels, and troops, enabling rapid response to Pacific threats. Denies China potential hubs (e.g., Manus Island). | Bears costs for exclusive facilities’ maintenance/development, with termination risks if PNG ends the treaty (12-month notice). |
| Overall Implementation & Termination (Articles 9-12) | Annual consultations ensure PNG input, with amendments by mutual consent. | Disputes settled bilaterally, no international arbitration—favoring Australia’s leverage. PNG’s weaker position could lead to unequal outcomes. | Strengthens Australia’s regional influence, aligning with AUKUS/Quad without U.S. delays. | Open-ended duration ties Australia to PNG’s instability (e.g., corruption, tribal violence), with termination possible but liabilities lingering. |
Key Irregularities and Asymmetries
- One-Sided Concessions
The treaty is not truly mutual. PNG provides “unimpeded access” to facilities and concedes jurisdiction, while reciprocal access for PNGDF in Australia is vague and “in future” (Article 7(2)). Annex B enhances Australian privileges in PNG but offers no equivalent for PNG in Australia. This asymmetry echoes colonial-era treaties where weaker parties ceded control.
2) Vague Terms
“Agreed Facilities and Areas” are defined via future arrangements (Article 7(4)), reviewed every three years. This could allow Australia to expand scope without PNG veto. “Defence Cooperation Activities” (Article 2) are broad, potentially including third-state involvement (e.g., U.S. via AUKUS) without explicit PNG approval.
Sovereignty Loopholes: While affirming sovereignty (Article 3), provisions like inviolability of Australian personnel/residences (Article 8) and force protection rights (Annex B, Article 6) could enable de facto extraterritoriality. No clear mechanisms for PNG to veto activities compromising its neutrality.
Third-Party Clauses
Both parties must avoid deals with third parties that “compromise” the treaty (Articles 4(5), 5(4)), but this is more restrictive for PNG, given its economic ties to China.
Irregular Precedent: The treaty’s jurisdictional concessions exceed typical SOFAs (e.g., U.S.-Japan), where host nations retain some criminal authority. Analysts note this could violate PNG’s Constitution if not ratified properly.
These irregularities stem from power imbalances: Australia’s GDP (~USD 1.7 trillion) dwarfs PNG’s (~USD 30 billion), enabling leverage through aid.
Who Gets the Most Out of the Treaty?
Australia benefits more substantially. The treaty secures strategic depth in a volatile Pacific, countering China’s ~USD 20 billion in regional investments and military outreach (e.g., Solomon Islands pact). It hedges against AUKUS delays (U.S. submarine deliveries pushed to 2040s) and U.S. isolationism (e.g., Trump review).
PNG gains tactical boosts like jobs and training, but at sovereignty’s expense—reinforcing dependency without equal strategic gains. As one analyst put it, “PNG gets capability; Australia gets control.”
In geopolitical terms, this aligns with Australia’s “Pacific family” narrative but risks backlash if PNG perceives it as neo-colonialism, potentially driving it toward neutral or pro-China stances.
Copy of the full Treaty can be downloaded here: https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/png-australia-mutual-defence-treaty.pdf
